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SPECIAL ARTICLE
The presentation of the mind-brain problem in leading
psychiatry journals
Alexander Moreira-Almeida,1 Saulo de F. Araujo,2 C. Robert Cloninger3
1Departamento de Clı´nica Me´dica, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF), Juiz de Fora, MG, Brazil.
2Departamento de Psicologia, UFJF, Juiz de Fora, MG, Brazil. 3Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO, USA.
Objective: The mind-brain problem (MBP) has marked implications for psychiatry, but has been
poorly discussed in the psychiatric literature. This paper evaluates the presentation of the MBP in the
three leading general psychiatry journals during the last 20 years.
Methods: Systematic review of articles on the MBP published in the three general psychiatry journals
with the highest impact factor from 1995 to 2015. The content of these articles was analyzed and
discussed in the light of contemporary debates on the MBP.
Results: Twenty-three papers, usually written by prestigious authors, explicitly discussed the MBP
and received many citations (mean = 130). The two main categories were critiques of dualism and
defenses of physicalism (mind as a brain product). These papers revealed several misrepresentations of
theoretical positions and lacked relevant contemporary literature. Without further discussion or evidence,
they presented the MBP as solved, dualism as an old-fashioned or superstitious idea, and physicalism as
the only rational and empirically confirmed option.
Conclusion: The MBP has not been properly presented and discussed in the three leading psychiatric
journals in the last 20 years. The few articles on the topic have been highly cited, but reveal misrepre-
sentations and lack of careful philosophical discussion, as well as a strong bias against dualism and
toward a materialist/physicalist approach to psychiatry.
Keywords: Body-mind relations; psychiatry; philosophy; neurosciences; neuropsychiatry
Introduction
The mind-brain problem (MBP) – the problem of how to
address the relation between mental phenomena and
neural or physical phenomena in general – is one of the
most fundamental philosophical and scientific questions
that psychiatry faces.1-4 Independently of whether it is
considered a singular, general problem, or a series of
interrelated specific problems (qualia, intentionality, men-
tal causation, etc.), the fact is that different solutions have
been proposed over time, but fundamental questions
remain unexplained. Contemporary debates have incor-
porated advances in both science and philosophy, leading
to new insights from theoretical and empirical research.
However, despite all these innovations and variations,
essentially, two general metaphysical positions remain at
stake. According to physicalism, mind is a material or phy-
sical process, a product of brain functioning. In contrast,
nonphysicalism claims that mind is something different
from, and may exist beyond, the brain.1 This antagonism
between physicalist and nonphysicalist perspectives on
human nature and the MBP has assumed different forms
throughout the centuries, being a constant feature of
Western thought, dating back at least to ancient Greece
and remaining alive in contemporary debates.5,6 Here,
two points should be made. First, both physicalism and
antiphysicalism appear under different forms in the litera-
ture. On the one hand, there is a difference between
reductive and nonreductive physicalist approaches,7-10
which leads to the epistemic problem of whether mental
phenomena can or cannot be reduced to more basic
physical phenomena. In the latter case, emergentism – the
theory according to which the mind emerges somehow
from the brain – has been defended as one of the best
candidates for a physicalist worldview.11-13 On the other
hand, there are various versions of nonphysicalism as well,
usually represented by different types of dualism, such as
substance dualism, nonsubstantial interactionist dualism,
and property dualism.14-17 Second, there is little agreement
on how to formulate both general positions, to the extent
that some theses, such as property dualism, can be under-
stood either in physicalist or nonphysicalist terms.18-21 This
happens, as Kim7(p.33) observes, ‘‘for the simple reason
that there is no consensus about either how physicalism is
to be formulated or how we should understand reduction.’’
This brief overview of contemporary debates on the
MBP reveals that, despite claims to the contrary, it is far
from being solved. For example, the problem of explaining
conscious experience remains an elusive mystery.22,23
Besides, there is an explanatory gap between known neu-
robiological mechanisms and many phenomena of funda-
mental importance for understanding human functioning
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(e.g., the qualitative properties of experience, meaning-
making, and creativity). This situation has direct implica-
tions for psychiatry, since the adoption of a theory of the
mind-brain relation impacts our views and attitudes about
human nature, free will, and treatment approaches.2-4 For
example, if a professional psychiatrist adopts a reductive
physicalist perspective on mental phenomena (i.e., mind
is reduced to/explained by brain activity), he or she will
probably end up believing that clinical phenomena, such
as depression, are basically an imbalance of physico-
chemical properties in the patient’s brain; this belief, in
turn, tends to predispose to specific treatment choices.
Consequently, as Kendler3(p.989) argues, ‘‘as a discipline,
psychiatry should be deeply interested in the MBP.’’
Given the relevance of discussions about the MBP for
psychiatric training and practice, we raise the question of
how debates surrounding this topic have appeared in
leading psychiatry journals. In other words, to what extent
is the complexity of the MBP reflected in such journals?
Accordingly, the aim of this study is to evaluate the pre-
sentation of the MBP in the three leading general psy-
chiatry journals in the last 20 years. Our intention is not to
defend any specific position on the MBP, but to analyze
how accurately it has been presented in such journals.
Methods
We searched the three general psychiatry journals with
the highest impact factors since 2007 (the oldest date
available at the Journal Citation Reports) for articles
(original papers, commentaries, reviews, and editorials).
These journals – the American Journal of Psychiatry,
British Journal of Psychiatry, and JAMA Psychiatry
(formerly Archives of General Psychiatry) – were chosen
because they reflect the most cited and influential journals
in the last decades. We are aware that our selection is
restrictive and may not reflect general psychiatric discus-
sion on the MBP; however, this was intentional, as our
central goal was to analyze how the MBP appears in the
three most prestigious and influential (i.e., most cited)
general psychiatric journals. We are equally aware that
some more philosophically oriented psychiatrists may
publish in different journals, but this does not reflect the
broad-spectrum tendency we are interested in.
We searched the three selected journals’ websites for
the terms Descartes OR dualism OR monism OR materi-
alism from January 1995 to May 2015. We then selected
papers that described these concepts and/or discussed
their implications for the MBP and psychiatry.
After this selection, we carefully read those papers that
presented a view on the MBP and its relation to psy-
chiatry. Papers that did not discuss the MBP specifically
despite matching the search parameters were excluded
from qualitative analysis. To evaluate the impact of the
selected papers, the number of citations of each was
obtained from Web of Science (February 2016). We then
grouped papers into thematic categories based on their
focus and approach to the MBP. After describing what
these papers stated about the MBP, we compared their
content with the original sources (e.g., what was written
about Descartes was compared with Descartes’s writings)
and with contemporary debates on the MBP, with special
emphasis on the current literature in philosophy of mind
and consciousness studies.
Results
Among the 442 documents retrieved by our search
strategy (articles, book reviews, and editorials), only 23
contained explicit discussions of or references to the
MBP: 14 published in the American Journal of Psychiatry,
seven in the British Journal of Psychiatry, and two in
JAMA Psychiatry (Table 1). Those papers were usually
written by prestigious authors in the field and received a
very high level of citation: 2,996 citations overall, mean
(SD) 130.3 (190.1) per paper. Nine of 23 articles received
more than 100 citations, one received 863, and only two
received fewer than 10 citations.
After reading all the selected documents, we grouped
their content into five different categories, as described
below. Most papers fell into two categories (e.g., critique
of dualism and defense of mind as a brain product).
Critique of Cartesian dualism or dualism in general
Among the 23 papers analyzed, 12 harshly criticized
dualism, especially Cartesian dualism. In summary, these
papers tended to cover the three topics described below.
Description of dualism
Miresco & Kirmayer4(p.913) accurately described mind-
brain dualism as ‘‘the idea that the mind is somehow
distinct from the brain and that its essence cannot be
reduced to purely material and deterministic neurological
mechanisms.’’ But dualism often is reported to not allow
mind-brain interaction, as if mind and brain were compart-
mentalized, noncommunicating parts of human beings.4,24-26
For example, it was stated that Cartesian dualism ‘‘splits
people into a mind and a brain’’27(p.117) or ‘‘fragments the
patient into a ‘brain’ and a ‘mind’,’’28(p.1959) thereby not allow-
ing the integration of mind and brain and not accepting
that mental activity (thought) could influence brain func-
tion.29,30 In contrast, Kendler rightly acknowledged that
Descartes defended the reciprocal influence of mind and
brain (interactionist dualism), despite Descartes’s difficulties
to explain it.3
Dualism’s dangers and harms
Based on the assumption that mind-brain dualism does
not allow mind-brain interactions, dualism was presented
as a major block to neuropsychiatry and to an integrative
or biopsychosocial understanding of patients, mental dis-
orders, and their treatments. Mind-body dualism was
described as a ‘‘perennial source of public confusion’’ and
‘‘of the stigmatization of the mentally ill,’’26(p.1262) a ‘‘pro-
blematic dichotomy.’’30(p.648) In a section titled ‘‘Shedding
the chains of Descartes,’’ one study claimed that ‘‘No phi-
losophical concept has been as ... potentially pernicious in
its effects as that of Cartesian dualism,’’31(p.434) while
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another stated that approaches based on Cartesian dualism
have ‘‘potential adverse consequences for patients.’’32(p.202)
Dualism is not intellectually credible
This strong claim was usually made without providing any
evidence or rationale to sustain it. For example, authors
spoke of ‘‘primitive dualist views of mind,’’25(p.1) affirmed
that dualistic assumptions in psychiatry ‘‘have long since
been abandoned by all thinking physicians,’’33(p.491) and
that ‘‘it is necessary to put aside the absurd brain-mind
dualisms of the past.’’34(p.480) Other authors, despite
acknowledging that ‘‘dualism has a long and venerable
history in Western tradition,’’ argued that ‘‘the idea that
mind and brain are different entities is no longer credible
in medical science.’’4(p.913) Since ‘‘few working scientists
today give much credence to classical Cartesian sub-
stance dualism,’’3(p.997) as it ‘‘seems too incredible,’’3(p.991)
‘‘it is time for the field of psychiatry to declare that Cartesian
substance dualism is false.’’31(p.434) Although one paper
recognized that neuroimaging raises metaphysical ques-
tions, it soon dismissed the subject by claiming that ‘‘this
has the potential for degenerating into the old mind-body
duality of Descartes.’’35(p.672)
Table 1 Papers on the mind-brain problem published in the three leading general psychiatry journals of the last 20 years and





American Journal of Psychiatry
1998 Kandel ER A new intellectual framework for psychiatry 420
1999 Kandel ER Biology and the future of psychoanalysis:
a new intellectual framework for psychiatry revisited
318
1999 Leshner AI Science is revolutionizing our view of addiction - and what to do about it 111
1999 Nemeroff CB, Kilts CD, Berns GS Functional brain imaging: twenty-first century phrenology or
psychobiological advance for the millennium?
30
2001 Kendler KS A psychiatric dialogue on the mind-body problem 28
2001 Gabbard GO, Kay J The fate of integrated treatment: whatever happened to the
biopsychosocial psychiatrist?
77
2001 Gabbard GO Empirical evidence and psychotherapy: a growing scientific base 117
2001 Kendler KS A psychiatric dialogue on the mind-body problem 28
2002 Yudofsky SC, Hales RE Neuropsychiatry and the future of psychiatry and neurology 28
2005 Kendler KS Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry 145
2005 Gabbard GO Mind, brain, and personality disorders 45
2006 Miresco MJ, Kirmayer LJ The persistence of mind-brain dualism in psychiatric
reasoning about clinical scenarios
41
2008 Beck AT The evolution of the cognitive model of depression and its
neurobiological correlates
287
2010 Insel T et al. Research domain criteria (RDoC): toward a new classification
framework for research on mental disorders
863
British Journal of Psychiatry
1995 Karlsson H, Kamppinen M Biological psychiatry and reductionism. Empirical findings and philosophy 10
1999 Rutter ML Psychosocial adversity and child psychopathology 103
2000 Gabbard GO A neurobiologically informed perspective on psychotherapy 78
2001 Kendell RE The distinction between mental and physical illness 47
2002 Persaud R Ten books 1
2003 Turner MA Psychiatry and the human sciences 10
2006 Peveler R, Katona C, Wessely S,
Dowrick C
Painful symptoms in depression: under-recognised and under-treated? 15
Archives of General Psychiatry/JAMA Psychiatry
2009 Insel TR Translating scientific opportunity into public health impact: a strategic plan
for research on mental illness
194
2015 Ross DA,Travis MJ,Arbuckle MR The future of psychiatry as clinical neuroscience. Why not now? 0
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Defense of mind as a brain product and mental disorders
as brain disorders
Nine papers stated that mind is a product of brain activity
and/or that mental disorders are brain disorders. How-
ever, such crucial statements were often presented as
plain facts (e.g., ‘‘what we call ‘mind’ can be understood
as the activity of the brain’’27(p.117)). Also, generalizations
were made with no supporting references, such as ‘‘most
psychiatrists in the post-Cartesian era regard the mind as
the activity of the brain,’’30(p.648) and ‘‘in accord with an
overwhelming degree of clinical and scientific evidence,
we should conclude that the human first-person world
of subjective experience emerges from and is entirely
dependent upon brain functioning.’’31(p.434) One exception
was the description of ‘‘enormous scientific support’’ for
physicalism: ‘‘specific lesions of the brain produce specific
alterations in behavior, and specific alterations in behavior
are reflected in characteristic functional changes in the
brain.’’24(p.460) Some authors acknowledged that how the
brain generates mind/behaviour24,35,36 or how mind can
influence the brain31(p.434) remain obscure. In a call for a
‘‘new intellectual framework for psychiatry,’’ the first
principle was: ‘‘All mental processes, even the most
complex psychological processes, derive from operations
of the brain. The central tenet of this view is that what
we commonly call mind is a range of functions carried out
by the brain.’’24(p.460) Another paper was less definitive,
proposing that ‘‘emergent materialism is a plausible stance
in biological psychiatry.’’37(p.434)
Since mind is assumed to be a product of brain activity,
mental disorders were presented as brain disorders.38(p.130)
According to a neuroscientific approach to psychiatry, ‘‘The
diseases that we treat are diseases of the brain.’’39(p.414)
Another reference stated, ‘‘studies of brain and behavior
have shown addiction to be the quintessential biobeha-
vioral disorder.’’6(p.1) More recently, a proposition of a new
framework for psychiatric classification ‘‘conceptualizes
mental illnesses as brain disorders. In contrast to neuro-
logical disorders with identifiable lesions, mental disorders
can be addressed as disorders of brain circuits.’’40(p.749)
Defense of mind-brain dualism
We found three papers defending some form of mind-
brain dualism. One author recognized that investigations
of cognitive and biological aspects of depression pose a
philosophical problem, namely, ‘‘How can one reconcile
two totally different levels of abstraction: mentalism and
materialism? The cognitive and neurophysiological appro-
aches use different concepts, research strategies, and
technical procedures.’’41(p.974) Setting this problem aside,
he continued, ‘‘I believe that it is possible to present a prag-
matic formulation of the interaction of the two levels.’’41(p.974)
Another author argued that, ‘‘This view that the brain is the
seat of consciousness, but that its conscious states are not
just physical states, is called dual aspect theory and this is
what I personally subscribe to.’’42(p.261) Finally, one paper
affirmed ‘‘The different constitutive principles of the mental
and physical give reason to think that not all mental illness
has a physical cause.’’43(p.473)
Critical discussion of physicalism in psychiatry
We found only two papers discussing a physicalist,
neuroscience-based approach to psychiatry in a criti-
cal way (i.e., considering it a hypothesis or pointing to
unresolved conceptual and methodological difficulties).
Their defense of materialism notwithstanding, two authors
affirmed that ‘‘biological psychiatry is in a confused
state,’’37(p.434) and that the disadvantage of reductionist
models in psychiatry ‘‘has been that they have fostered
research designs in biological psychiatry which seem to
favour over-simplistic interpretations of the results.’’37(p.435)
Another author argued that,
in terms of aetiology, the claim that mental illness can have
physical causes is not enough to sustain Kendell’s [physicalist]
claim. The physical symptoms of illness are presumably
related to underlying physical causes by laws that can be
sharpened as science improves our knowledge of the physical
universe. In the case of mental symptoms, since there are no
laws there is no such hope [...]43(p.473)
Overview of different philosophical positions
The last thematic category included two papers. In a very
broad dialogue-like article, Kendler3(p.989) offered a ‘‘selec-
tive primer for past and current perspectives on the mind-
body problem,’’ which includes Cartesian dualism, eliminative
materialism, and others. In the same vein, Persaud listed
a series of books and intellectuals that, according to him,
have contributed to understanding the situation in con-
temporary psychiatry.42
Discussion
Our findings indicate that the MBP has been neither
carefully nor systematically addressed in the three leading
general psychiatry journals with the highest impact factors
during the last 20 years. We found only 23 papers
published in this period which discussed, or made explicit
reference to, this challenging problem that affects psy-
chiatric training, research, and practice so greatly. More-
over, these papers were usually authored by prestigious
and highly cited psychiatrists and had high citation rates –
much higher than the three top cited journals’ average.
This suggests that those views on MBP have been
influential and may have helped shape the field’s stance
on the subject.
A careful reading of those articles on the MBP, how-
ever, reveals a series of misrepresentations of theoretical
positions (often based on secondary literature), lack
of relevant contemporary literature on the topic, and a
strong bias toward reductive physicalism in psychiatry. In
summary, without further discussion or evidence, these
authors present the MBP as solved, dualism as an old-
fashioned/superstitious idea, and physicalism (mind as a
brain product) as the only rational option and the only one
that has undoubtedly been empirically confirmed. We are
not arguing that physicalism (either in its reductive or
nonreductive forms) is false. Given the current state of
our knowledge, it should be considered a viable and
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promising hypothesis for the MBP, a good framework for
research. The problem, in our view, is the misrepresenta-
tion of alternative hypotheses and the presentation of
physicalism as the only game in town or as a proven fact.
Let us discuss these points in detail (summary presented
in Table 2).
Beginning with the problem of misrepresentation, Carte-
sian dualism usually appears as a caricature. The articles
that criticize it do not contain concrete references to
Descartes’s texts, let alone sustained philosophical dis-
cussions about the complexities of his position on the MBP.
For example, there is no mention of the distinction between
the metaphysical and the empirical levels of analysis, which
is crucial for a proper understanding of Cartesian dualism.
Specifically, at the metaphysical level, body and soul are
completely different substances, but at the empirical level
of daily life, which is the level of interest for psychiatrists,
they are not separated, instead constituting a tightly
knit, indivisible psychophysical unit, as Descartes himself
described:
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger,
thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a
sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and,
as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.
If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would
not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the
damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight
if anything in his ship is broken.44(p.56)
In this sense, Cartesian dualism does not deny the
empirical unity of mind and body that psychiatrists find in
their daily practice. Instead, this unity appears throughout
Descartes’ analysis of psychological phenomena, as one
can read in his Passions of the Soul,45 where he presents
and discusses psychosomatic symptoms. In summary,
rather than defending a deep gap between the mind and
the brain, Descartes clearly proposed a kind of interac-
tionist dualism. Therefore, if the lack of interaction between
mind and brain is the reason for rejecting Cartesian
dualism in psychiatry, then there is no reason at all. The
problem, so it seems, is that Descartes has been often
mentioned but very rarely read and understood in the
psychiatric literature.
It is worth noting that these misrepresentations of
Descartes in the medical literature have been previously
explored.46-48 For example, the conclusions of Brown seem
to apply to our data regarding the psychiatric literature:
Many similar references in the literature exhibit the charac-
teristic features of a shared mythology. Rather than present-
ing a nuanced and unfolding interpretation based on fresh
readings of the primary historical texts, modern authors in the
field of psychosomatics regularly repeat stock phrases and
offer minor variations of identical interpretations. Descartes is
depicted as a villain whose dualistic theory sharply separated
mind from body, leaving an earlier holistic medicine in
disarray.47(p.322)
If Cartesian dualism is to be presented more accurately
and in accordance with current scholarship in the phi-
losophy of mind, one should avoid pejorative terms, such
as ‘‘absurd,’’ ‘‘pernicious,’’ ‘‘old,’’ and the like, and consider
that it is alive in ongoing mind-brain debates.49-52
Moreover, it is important to note that Cartesian dualism
is not the only form of dualism that appears in the
literature as alternative to physicalism.14-16,53-55 David
Chalmers, for example, defends a form of dualism that
takes conscious experience as a basic feature or reality,
which cannot be reduced to anything else in nature. While
avoiding the problem of reductionism, his naturalistic dualism
is also intended to be compatible with a nonreductive form of
physicalism. In his own words:
Although a remarkable number of phenomena have turned
out to be explicable wholly in terms of entities simpler than
themselves, this is not universal. In physics, it occasionally
happens that an entity has to be taken as fundamental.
Table 2 Main misrepresentations of the mind-brain problem in leading psychiatry journals




Mind and brain as compartmentalized,
noninteracting parts of human beings
Descartes proposed an interactionist dualism,
with profound, constant, and mutual mind-body influences
Dangers and
harms of dualism
Major block to neuropsychiatry and a
biopsychosocial approach
Interactionist dualism does not deny neuropsychiatry




Dualism is a primitive/superstitious view,
not intellectually credible. No learned
person accepts it
Dualism is alive in contemporary mind-brain debates,
defended by reputable philosophers and neuroscientists
Mind-brain
relationship
It has been proved that mind is a
product of brain activity (physicalism)
The mind-brain relationship is still an open question.
Most empirical findings can be accommodated to both
physicalist and nonphysicalist views of the mind
Psychiatrists’
views of the MBP
Most psychiatrists accept physicalist
views of mind
There are very few studies on the subject, and the available
evidence suggests that a substantial portion of psychiatrists, health
professionals, and university students reject physicalist views of mind
Nature of mental
disorders
Mental disorders are brain disorders/
diseases and this view would reduce
stigma
The nature of mental disorders is a controversial topic. Mental disorders are
related to a wide range of biopsychosocial factors. There is consistent evidence
that biogenetic explanations of mental disorders are related to more stigma
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Fundamental entities are not explained in terms of anything
simpler. Instead, one takes them as basic, and gives a theory
of how they relate to everything else in the world. I suggest
that a theory of consciousness should take experience as
fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires
the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as
everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of
consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical
feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to
see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will
take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world,
alongside mass, charge, and space-time.53(p.359-60)
Unfortunately, we could not find any effort in the
selected publications to distinguish the various types of
dualism, nor any discussion about dualistic alternatives to
the Cartesian model. This may indicate that psychiatrists
tend to conflate dualism with Cartesian dualism (fre-
quently, with one of its caricatures).
Apart from misrepresentation and lack or relevant
philosophical literature, we also found a strong bias in
most theoretical discussions. In contrast with dualism,
which is constantly criticized (often in a very superficial
way), materialist/physicalist approaches are hastily pre-
sented as the only plausible model for a scientific psy-
chiatry. Only two papers discussed the problems and
impasses of biological psychiatry. Materialism/physicalism
is usually presented not as a hypothesis, but as a plain fact,
which warrants no further discussion. As previously indi-
cated, this does not reflect the state of the art in philosophy
of mind and consciousness studies, in which physicalist
approaches appear as hypothetical models of explana-
tion that are frequently criticized and have their limits
exposed.17,56,57 For example, Nagel reminds us of how
consciousness remains intractable from our current phy-
sicalist point of view:
Consciousness is the most conspicuous obstacle to a
comprehensive naturalism that relies only on the resources
of physical science. The existence of consciousness seems
to imply that the physical description of the universe, in spite
of its richness and explanatory power, is only part of the
truth, and that the natural order is far less austere than it
would be if physics and chemistry accounted for everything.
If we take this problem seriously, and follow out its impli-
cations, it threatens to unravel the entire naturalistic world
picture.57(p.35)
In the papers we analyzed, it is often assumed that the
mere correlation of brain states with mind activity or the
empirical verification that brain damage or stimulation
generates changes in mental function constitute undeni-
able evidence that the mind is a product of the brain.
However, it may be argued that such empirical findings
fit both physicalist (the brain produces the mind) and
nonphysicalist (the brain is a tool or filter for manifestation
of the mind) perspectives. William James58 recognized
this possibility more than a century ago, as did two pairs
of philosophers and neuroscientists after him.59,60 None
of the papers we identified made any effort to discuss
alternative hypotheses that might explain the same empirical
data advanced in favor of a physicalist explanation.
Additionally, despite a clear defense of physicalism, no
sufficient justification is presented for accepting it. Some
claim that dualists cannot adequately explain how the
mind, being an immaterial substance, would interact with
the brain. That is true, but likewise, no one has succeeded
in explaining ‘‘how the brain gives rise to various mental
processes.’’24(p.460) In fact, defenders of physicalism often
recognize that ‘‘we are far from having a realist neuro-
biology of clinical syndromes and even farther from
having a neurobiology of psychotherapy.’’24(p.467) How-
ever, none of this is taken as a possible reason for raising
doubts about the validity of the physicalist model, as
Nagel does. In fact, several authors who defend this kind
of physicalism revive what Popper called ‘‘promissory
materialism,’’ which ‘‘consists, essentially, of a historical
(or historicist) prophecy about the future results of brain
research and their impact. [...] No attempt is made to
resolve the difficulties of materialism by argument. No
alternatives to materialism are even considered.’’59(p.56)
Additionally, they do not address the failure of materialism
to deliver on its promise over the centuries or in modern
psychiatry.6,61
In the same line, it is also assumed, with no pre-
sentation of supporting evidence, that all rational and
science-oriented minds reject dualism and accept phy-
sicalism. This can be empirically refuted at different
levels. First, many scientists and philosophers cited in the
present paper defend a nonphysicalist position on the
MBP. Second, surveys of European university students
and health professionals62 and of Brazilian psychiatrists63
found high levels (ranging from 40 to 67%) of rejection
of physicalist perspectives on the MBP. Third, a recent
international survey among professional philosophers
(mainly from Europe and North America) revealed that
only 34.6% fully accepted a physicalist view of mind.64
This evidence shows that many well-educated and
learned individuals from distinct areas related to the
MBP do not endorse physicalism, despite claims to the
contrary in the articles reviewed herein. Although this
cannot be taken as a philosophical argument, it serves as
empirical evidence against the claim that all educated
persons are committed to physicalism.
Another case of bias is present in discussions about
topics associated with research and clinical practice in
psychiatry is valorization of neuroscience, promotion of
integrative approaches, and reduction of stigma on
patients. Again, physicalist views on the MBP are often
presented as the only way to achieve the laudable goals
just described. However, neuroscience is important not
only to the physicalist but also to the dualist psychiatrist.
Assuming close and constant interconnections between
the mind and the brain is the essential factor in under-
standing, promoting, and practicing an integrative biop-
sychosocial approach to mental disorders. The problem
lies in the extremes of brainless and mindless appro-
aches.65 For example, regarding stigma, two recent
systematic reviews66,67 found that narrowly biogenetic
explanations of mental disorders (e.g., ‘‘brain diseases,’’
‘‘chemical imbalances’’) unintentionally produce more
stigma and rejection of patients, who are perceived as
not in charge of themselves, unpredictable, and dangerous.
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Alternative approaches recognize that mind-body interac-
tions can empower patients with the hope and confidence
needed to promote health by increasing their freedom from
prior conditioning.68,69
Some authors seem to conflate a methodological with a
metaphysical claim. It may be argued that most scientists
are committed to methodological naturalism – minimally
understood as the thesis that scientific research deals
only with natural phenomena – and that, therefore, psy-
chiatrists as natural scientists should follow this precept
and study mental phenomena as natural phenomena,
often understood in a narrow sense, i.e., in their relation to
the brain. However, methodological naturalism does not
entail physicalism, which is a metaphysical thesis about
the ultimate nature of reality. As Hudson70(p.169) argues,
‘‘one could take naturalism to be a restriction on the
sources and scope of knowledge without taking any stand
whatsoever on whether those sources were adequate to
investigate all the furniture of the world.’’ Moreover, jumpi-
ng to hasty metaphysical conclusions can lead psychia-
trists to conflate science with scientism, the belief that
everything in the world must be ‘‘beholden to the stric-
tures of science or to those causal dependencies that are
the stock in trade of the developed sciences.’’71(p.39) In
other words, if something defies traditional scientific
explanations, as consciousness has done so far, it does
not mean that it must be forced at all costs into those
same explanatory schemes.
Given the problems above, we conclude that the MBP
has not been properly presented and discussed in the
three leading psychiatric journals in the last 20 years.
The few articles in which the topic appears have been
highly cited, but often reveal misrepresentations and lack
of careful philosophical discussions, as well as a strong
bias against dualism and toward a materialist/physicalist
approach to psychiatry. This lack of theoretical clarifica-
tion may lead to unfortunate consequences in psychiatric
training and clinical practice. Accepting neuroscience and
promoting the advancement of psychiatry and the well-
being of our patients does not necessitate hastily adopting
a certain metaphysical perspective on the MBP or con-
sidering it solved. It is in the best interest of science and of
patients that we keep a scientific mind, which involves
open-minded critical thinking. According to philosopher of
science Imre Lakatos, scientific progress is facilitated by
open-minded competition among alternative approaches:
It would be wrong to assume that one must stay with a
research programme until it has exhausted all its heuristic
power, that one must not introduce a rival programme before
everybody agrees that the point of degeneration has probably
been reached. (...) The history of science has been and
should be a history of competing research programmes (...):
the sooner competition starts, the better for progress.
‘Theoretical pluralism’ is better than ‘theoretical mon-
ism.’72(p.154-5)
In this sense, given the status of our current knowledge
and the absence of a satisfactory theory of the MBP, the
best way to achieve progress in psychiatry is to recognize
that the MBP is far from being solved and to be open to
competing theoretical models, as is being done in con-
temporary physics and philosophy of mind. It is crucial
that several models of the MBP, including physicalist and
nonphysicalist ones, be allowed to develop and show
their value (or lack thereof). Rather than misrepresenting
potential candidates, it is more productive to consider
alternative hypotheses seriously and test them rigorously
with respect for what they propose. Psychiatry could
benefit from such competition to move beyond its current
limitations.
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